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Abstract
This study looks at how social factors can be leveraged
to dissuade online piracy in digital This study leverage
persuasive computing to influence consumers' decision
making process regarding their acquisition of online
music and seeks to identify how different persuasive
techniques can, in a pay way you want context, anchor
the consumers' reference price to an amount
significantly different from 0.

1. Introduction
The ugly spectacle of online piracy in digital goods
has received much attention but how social factors can
be leveraged to support, influence and manipulate legal
shopping while dissuading piracy is not well
understood. Digitized information goods such as
music, books and movies are highly susceptible to
piracy [1] because they can be copied at zero marginal
costs [2] as creation and distribution technologies
continues to advance ahead of existing strategies for
their packaging, pricing and sale, especially with
small-sized music files [3]. Thus, music providers are
particularly challenged as they strive to be profitable in
a digital economy where consumers can obtain music
for free. Some early estimates suggested a decline in
music sales from $13.7 billion in 1998 to $8.5 billion
in 2008 (Recording Industry Association of America
[4]), and industry players have been unequivocal in
blaming this trend on online piracy. In addition,
copyright protection technologies such as Digital
Rights Management systems have been ineffective at
combatting online piracy [5], and music content
providers are being forced to rethink their digital
business strategies [6].
Consequently, music producers are reacting by
delegating more pricing power to consumers through
participating pricing schemes such as “Pay What You
Want (PWYW)” and “Name Your Own Price
(NYOM)” [7] in attempt to convert sales from “free”
consumers. Such pricing schemes are only just
emerging and their advantages over traditional fixed
prices are yet to be established. The few studies
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conducted to date have reported that consumers pay
positive amounts for music under PWYW due to prosocial behaviors (e.g. [8]; [9]) although the amounts
paid were unprofitable. More broadly, we are still
limited in our understanding of what allows individuals
to break from social and legal constraints to pirate
digital music, and how participative pricing
mechanisms can be effectively leveraged to persuade
consumers to pay for online music.
The current study explores the welfare of music
producers relying on PWYW pricing schemes to
sustain profits. Such producers face the risk that
consumers may exploit their control of prices and pay
nothing at all or a price below the seller’s costs [10].
Additional persuasion may therefore be necessary to
influence prices paid, but what and how persuasive
techniques influence potential shoppers to yield
desirable outcomes is unclear. Thus, we address this
related question: How can consumers purchasing
music in a PWYW scheme be persuaded to pay an
amount different from $0? This question is important
because it can potentially build on extant PWYW
research to expand understanding of how consumers
who have access to free online music can be converted
to pay through legal channels.
In the rest of the paper, we first briefly outline
relevant literatures in participative pricing schemes and
persuasive computing, and develop a research model to
address our question. We then describe our on-going
methodology for collecting data to empirically test the
model. We conclude by discussing expected results
and their anticipated theoretical and practical
implications.

2. Theoretical Background
2.2. Participative Pricing Schemes and Pay
What You Want
Pricing strategies generally aim to maximize
sellers’ profits by capturing consumers’ heterogeneous
product valuations and accounting for competition and
cannibalization. This is because consumers’ reactions
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to different prices may not be purely rational but driven
by behavioral aspects such as perceptions and
preferences [10]. Therefore, sellers are exploring
innovative and unconventional pricing strategies such
as auctions, Name-Your Own-Price, and Pay-WhatYou-Want, that seek to involve consumers in the pricesetting process ([7]; [32]; [33]; [34]; [35]). The
enabling role of the internet in providing a direct link
to consumers has made it easier to implement
participative pricing mechanisms [36]. Such
mechanisms allow for differentiated prices and
accounts for heterogeneous valuations of consumers to
increase efficiency [37], while also enabling sellers to
serve buyers who would otherwise be priced out of the
market [2]. Participative pricing mechanisms have
been shown to be effective and preferable for
consumers. For example, consumers preferred to
participate actively in setting the final price than to
accept posted prices, and the higher perceived control
of the buyers led to a greater intent to purchase [38]. In
addition, consumers have higher fairness perceptions
and satisfaction when they play a role in the pricesetting process than when the prices are set by the
retailer [39]. Sellers implementing participative pricing
model may also attract consumers’ attention,
potentially leading to (new) customers as their
popularity increases by word-of-mouth [10].
PWYW is the participative pricing model of
interest in this study. It is different from other
participative pricing models because buyers are given
absolute control over the price-setting so that the buyer
can set any price above or equal to zero which the
seller cannot reject [10]. We focus on PWYW because
it has been successfully implemented for online music
(Radiohead’s In Rainbows album Oct to Dec 2007 who
reported unprecedented profits) and gaining increased
attention in online music research (cf. [8]; [9]).
However, there is the risk that buyers exploit their
control and pay nothing at all or a price well below
seller’s cost [10]. Such a scenario will have several
adverse implications for an online music provider
implementing a PWYW model. Firstly, no minimum
price is implemented that could protect the music
provider against payment of $0. Secondly, under
PWYW, the music provider supplies a legitimate
channel for distribution to pirates. Therefore, the
provider relinquishes any statutory protection they
would otherwise enjoy under copyright laws. In effect,
PWYW may provide an opportunity for pirates to
legalize their activities while potentially denying the
music provider the legal means for cost recovery or
compensations for copyright infringement. Therefore,
given the uncertainty of buyer’s pricing behavior in
PWYW and the impact of PWYW on sellers’ revenues,
it is important to explore additional persuasive

mechanisms that can balance the scale in the music
providers’ favor by encouraging buyers to be willing to
pay an amount sufficiently different from $0.

2.3. Persuasive Computing
Persuasive computing (the use of computers as
persuasive technologies) can be a useful mechanism
for increasing consumer willingness-to-pay for online
music under a PWYW pricing model. Persuasive
computing is a relatively new paradigm in humancomputer interaction (HCI) research that focuses on the
use of computers to persuade behavioral change in
users [40]. Persuasive computing draws on the
Computer As a Social Actor (CASA) model [41] and
the Media Equation theory [42] which both posit that
individuals respond to and interact with media and
technology just as they would in a social interaction
with other individuals.
Persuasive computing has been applied to study
and encourage behavior change in a number of
domains, notably health care and environmental
sustainability. A survey of the literature shows that the
targeted behaviors are often those that are entrenched
and not easily amenable to change (e.g. smoking,
dieting and physical activity in health care; energy and
water use, air pollution, recycling and waste disposal in
sustainability) [46]. Thus, persuasive designs present
interventions for encouraging change in individuals
toward desired behaviors when, left on their own, such
individuals may not be aware of the need for change or
may simply be comfortable with the status quo. We
argue that in the context of this study, the behavior of
individuals who consume online music for free can be
described as behaviors that require specific
interventions before change can happen. That is, ceteris
paribus, “free” consumers will continue to perpetuate
that behavior unless deliberate effort is expended to
counter this behavior.
At the core of persuasive designs is the notion
that feedback on behavioral performance framed in a
positive or negative way can guide individuals to make
changes to favor the desired behavior or attitude [47].
When considering online piracy as a crime, one social
theory from criminology that can be combined with
feedback to change behavior is the theory of
Neutralization Techniques [48]. Neutralization
techniques theory posits that individuals' intentionally
suspend their moral and conscientious compass
temporary to commit an illegitimate act. That is,
individuals learn techniques they can use to rationalize
their actions and excuse themselves from personal
responsibility for the time being in order to commit a
crime [48]. Five types of justifications commonly used
to neutralize demands for social conformity include:
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denial of responsibility (“it is not my fault’), denial of
injury (‘‘no harm will result from my actions’’), denial
of victim (‘‘nobody got hurt’’), condemnation of the
condemners (‘‘how dare they judge me, considering
how corrupt and hypocritical they themselves are’’),
and appeal to higher loyalties (‘‘there is a greater and
higher cause’’) [48]. (See first column in Table 1).
Neutralization techniques are best applicable to
minor types of crimes and delinquency [49] which
supports the theory’s applicability to music piracy [24].
Studies that have examined the use of neutralization
techniques in digital piracy found a significant but
weak link with software piracy ([50]; [51]), moderate
levels of music piracy [24], and diminishing
longitudinal effects in quasi-experimental field settings
[29]. However, while prior studies focused on the
types and levels of neutralization at work in online
music piracy, the present study draws on their findings
to pursue a uniquely different goal; to develop and
implement persuasive techniques aimed at countering
the effect of neutralization techniques used by “free”
online music consumers.

3. Research Model
The research model for this study is shown in
Figure 1. In the sections below, we develop hypotheses
about consumer willingness-to-pay in PWYW contexts
under persuasive intervention.
Willingness to Pay

H1
Persuasive
Technique
s

Internal
Reference
Price

Music Revenue
H3

H2

Prices
Paid

Proportion
of surplus
shared

Figure 1. Consumer WTP under Persuasion in PWYW
Pricing for Online Music

3.1. Willingness-to-Pay for Online Music under
PWYW
In a PWYW setting where consumers can
determine any price for the product they buy, the final
prices paid consists of two principal components: the
buyers’ internal reference price (their valuation of the
normal cost of the product) and the proportion of the
reference price that the buyer is willing to discharge to
the seller (Kim et al, 2009). The marketing literature
suggests that reference prices have a strong impact on
consumer behavior [52]; [53]. Consumers’ perceptions
of current prices are influenced by their internal

reference prices based on past prices or on externally
provided prices such as advertised prices or prices of
competing products [54]. This argument is related to
the notion of constructed preferences [68] which
suggests that consumers are often uncertain about their
valuation of a product and use cues to determine their
willingness to pay (WTP). While such cues can be
consumers’ internal reference price or an externally
provided reference price, PWYW products often offer
no external reference prices for products traded and
consumers have to rely solely on their internal
reference prices [10].
Online pirates have been shown to deny
responsibility for their actions on the basis that it is not
financially possible to legally purchase all the music
they desire [24]. Yet, consumers who frequently access
online music for free may not even be aware of market
prices of full albums or individual track downloads.
Therefore, when a legitimate channel is made available
under PWYW, denial of responsibility for payment by
“free” consumers may arise from the ambiguity of
prices they think they are expected to pay, irrespective
of their valuation of the music. This allows them to
contend that if an anchor price for downloading music
were clearer, then they would resort to setting a
reasonable price for the music. Therefore, this
neutralization technique on the part of the consumer
can be directly countered with a persuasive
intervention designed to present external reference
prices for consumers (e.g compare prices on iTunes,
etc.) while in the process of purchasing music under
PWYW. Empirically, Regner and Barria [9] found that
the recommended payment of $8 for an album was
actually paid 55% of the time, although their voluntary
pricing scheme was not a true PWYW because it
required a $5 minimum payment which was paid by
14% of the consumers. Therefore, in PWYW context, a
persuasive intervention that provides an external
reference price will serve as an additional cue to aid
the construction of a consumer’s internal reference
price in the direction of an economically acceptable
price range. The first hypothesis is thus:
H1: Implementation of persuasive techniques in
a PWYW platform will increase internal
reference price valuation by consumers of
online music
In addition, a PWYW setting that gives absolute
control of price determination to a buyer should lead a
rational customers who wishes to maximize her single
purchase utility to exploit the mechanism to pay a price
of zero [10]. However, this is often not the case
because the exchange between the buyer and seller is
governed more by social-market than money market
relationships [57]. That is, in money-market
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relationships, exchange between two parties is
regulated by the use of a value or a utility metric, e.g.,
the price for a product [58] but non-posted prices or
non-payments lead exchange partners to act according
to social exchange norms (i.e., norms of reciprocity,
norms of cooperation or norms of distribution) [59]
which in turn influence the buyer’s behavior [57].
Since PWYW dissolves the usual money-market
relationship between seller and buyer, the use of social
exchange norms such as impression management (not
willing to appear cheap) and avoiding social
disapproval should lead individuals to pay prices
greater than zero at PWYW in face-to-face interactions
[10]. Empirically, field studies on consumers’ WTP
under PWYW find that consumers often pay positive
amounts due to pro-social behaviors ([58]; [59]; [8];
[9]).
Pro-social behaviors arising from online social
influence has been shown to influence consumer
decisions such as what music to subscribe for [60] or
listen to [61], what books to purchase [62], what videos
to watch on youtube [63], and how much contribution
to make in crowdfunding [64]. Given the strong impact
of social influence on online consumer behavior, prosocial persuasive techniques that operationalize
measures to counter neutralization techniques used by
“free” consumers are likely to effectively motivate
them to share a higher proportion of their surplus with
the music provider. That is, individuals who consume
free online music are known to employ neutralization
techniques such as denial of responsibility (when
individuals note the widespread availability of
unauthorized music online or the ambiguity of laws
regulating downloading); denial of injury/denial of
victim (when individuals feel that the recording
industry reaps a sizable profit and has enough capital
not to suffer lost revenue from free downloads);
condemnation of condemners (when individuals fault
the music industry for ‘‘overcharging’’ the consumer
through monopolistic practices); and appeal to higher
loyalties (when individuals contend that obtaining the
unauthorized music fulfills a greater cause or purpose,
such as meeting the needs of significant others or a
work or school obligation) ([30]; [24]).
In a PWYW setting, these rationalizations will
negatively influence the proportion of surplus
consumers will be willing to share with the music
provider. Yet, because such rationalizations are very
personal, they may not sufficiently manifest
themselves in social norms to be influenced by social
media interventions alone. Personal rationalizations
can be challenged by presenting persuasive arguments
framed to respond directly to the neutralization
techniques used by free music consumers. Such
persuasive techniques designed to expose illegitimate

justifications for errant behavior can cause consumers
to revise their attitudes, assumptions and beliefs held
about free online music and likely increase the
proportion of surplus they will share with PWYW
music providers. Personal rationalizations can be
further weakened by additional persuasive techniques
such as providing a simulating experience for
consumers to directly link their payments to a music
provider’s increased wealth, providing tailored
feedback to reinforce positive payments, timing
persuasive messages to appear at an opportune time
(kairos effect) ([43]; [44]), and using seductive design
techniques such as aesthetics, humor, curiosity,
surprise and delighters [45] to elicit positive user
emotions while they are engaged on the PWYW
platform. Given that persuasive techniques can
neutralize the rationalizations employed by free
consumers in PWYW and encourage them to perform
more pro-social behaviors, the second hypothesis is
thus:
H2: Implementation of persuasive techniques in
a PWYW platform will increase the
proportion of surplus shared by consumers
of online music

3.3. WTP and Music Revenues in PWYW
under Persuasion
We propose that under persuasion, the level of
revenue realized will be influenced by persuasive
techniques through their effects on internal reference
price and proportion of surplus shared. Hypothesis 1
and 2 suggest that persuasive techniques designed to
attenuate the use of neutralization techniques by
PWYW music consumers will increase their internal
reference price valuation for music and the proportion
of surplus they might be willing to share. If these
manipulations are successful, the final prices paid for
music will be higher than in PWYW contexts with no
persuasions. Yet, neutralization theory would suggest a
more nuanced effect of the drivers of internal reference
price and proportion of surplus shared by consumers
on the final prices paid. That is, research on
neutralization theory proposes that the relationship
between neutralizations and deviance may be
curvilinear ([65]; [49]) because individuals who rely
most on neutralizations to excuse their behavior are
those who are only partly committed to the behavior
under study. In other words, neutralization techniques
may not be relevant for those individuals who are
either totally committed to conventional behaviors or
totally committed to deviant behaviors [65].
The nonlinear effect of neutralization techniques
has been found significant cross-sectionally across
different levels of student participation in music piracy
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(Ingram and Hinduja, 2008) and longitudinally across
earlier versus later levels of music piracy over a fourweek study [30]. Drawing on these findings, persuasive
interventions designed to counter neutralization
techniques may also result in nonlinear effects on WTP
and revenues realized from music consumers in
PWYW. Specifically, consumers may initially respond
to moderate levels of persuasive techniques by
upwardly adjusting their internal reference prices and
proportion of surplus they want to share until the level
of their perceived control (e.g. ability to pay for music
based on their income) [25]. However, stronger
persuasive techniques (e.g. providing a “too high”
external reference price cue) will lead consumers to
believe they have little control over their WTP.
Consequently, they may choose not to make any
purchase on the PWYW platform because they are no
longer able to rely on neutralization techniques to
suppress their guilty feeling about their inability to pay
for the music. Thus, consumers may experience a form
of disutility whereby marginal increment in persuasive
techniques beyond their perceived control over their
WTP causes them to altogether abandon the music sold
through PWYW. The likely effect on revenue is that
higher prices will be paid for lower or higher volume
of downloads (depending on song popularity) until
consumers perceive a lack of control over their WTP,
resulting in low volume of downloads. Formally, these
arguments are stated in the following hypotheses:
H3a: High internal reference price and proportion
of surplus shared by consumers under a
moderate level of persuasion in PWYW will
lead to high prices paid
H3b: High internal reference price and proportion
of surplus shared, induced via a higher level
of persuasion in PWYW will lead to nonpayment

4. Methods
4.1. Experimental Design
We have selected to test our model by developing
a persuasive system to conduct a lab experiment, an
approach that is consistent with recent studies in
behavioral economics. In our experimental set up, the
unit of analysis is a song offered through the context of
PWYW. We will implement a 3x4 factorial design in
which we use 3 levels of persuasion (control,
moderate, and high) to manipulate four types of
persuasive techniques (techniques that counter denial
of responsibility, denial of injury/victim, condemnation
of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties). The

dependent variable is the price paid for music by
participants.

4.2. Operationalization
The PWYW context is being operationalized as
an online website that hosts songs for participants to
sample and purchase. Song profiles are differentiated
by quality using chart rankings and all participants
have access to the same song list. Participants are
asked to browse all songs and determine the price they
would pay for each song (i.e. their internal reference
price). Participants then have the option of purchasing
the songs they like by making an offer (i.e. the actual
price paid) and downloading their chosen songs. To
avoid anchoring effects between their internal
reference price and the actual prices paid, each song is
matched with a similarly ranked song and participants
determine prices for the first list of songs (list A) but
make purchases in the matched list of songs (list B). In
effect, participants’ reference prices for songs on list A
will be matched to their purchase prices for similarly
ranked songs on list B.
Persuasive techniques is operationalized as
additional features on the PWYW website. The control
condition will have no persuasive elements and
participants will have access to only the basic features
of the PWYW context. The treatment conditions will
have persuasive elements embedded in the PWYW
context. These elements aim to provide feedback to
participants on the impact of their performance
(willingness to pay) while also generally eliciting
positive emotional excitation to encourage them to be
more willing to pay for songs.
The levels of persuasion will be operationalized
with persuasive messages framed to counter the
neutralization techniques used by “free” music
consumers. Our persuasive techniques counter four
types of neutralization techniques used by free music
consumers and are largely adapted from instruments
used by Hinduja [51] and Ingram and Hinduja [24].
For the levels of persuasion, the control condition will
get no messages for any type of persuasive technique.
The moderate condition (moderate persuasion)
provides mild persuasive messages designed to counter
claims of denial of responsibility, denial of
injury/victim, condemnation of condemners, and
appeal to higher authority in order to encourage
participants to understand the need to pay for music
and act accordingly. The high condition (high
persuasion) provides stronger persuasive messages
designed to counter neutralization techniques but make
participants feel the demands made of them are too
high even though they understand the need to pay for
music.
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4.3. Data Collection
Data is collected through a web-based
experimental survey. In the first phase, we are
targeting undergraduate university students. We intend
to complement this data with additional data from
Mechanical Turkers in phase 2. Although there are
concerns with student samples for generalizing to the
broader population, its use in the current study is
appropriate because it has been reported that young
people are the most likely to obtain their music for free
[11] and university environments have been described
as hotbeds for free downloading of digital songs [4].
Our 3x4 factorial design has 12 cells in total and we
calculate that at conventional alpha, a sample size of
240 (20 per cell between-group) will yield adequate
power to detect a medium effect size. Participants will
be randomly assigned to a cell. The data collected from
students include reference prices for songs on list A,
paid prices for matched songs on list B, and the
number of downloads for songs on list B. Additionally,
students will provide responses to demographic
questionnaires. Students who agree to participate are
provided a link to one of the PWYW context websites
where they read introduction to the tasks to be
performed and sign consent forms. A pre-test is being
conducted with a small set of students to assess and
improve the psychometric properties of manipulations
before the main data collection.

4.4. Manipulation Checks
On completion of the experiment, all participants
will be asked to complete an exit questionnaire which
asks whether their reference prices determined for
songs on list A influenced their actual payments for
songs downloaded on list B. In addition, participants in
the persuasive conditions will be asked whether they
found (counter-neutralization) persuasive messages
reasonable or outrageous. Participants in the high
persuasion condition will be asked to indicate whether
messages made them feel guilty and yet perceive a lack
of control over their ability to pay.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our on-going study aims to understand the
welfare of music providers who rely on PWYW
pricing schemes to sustain their profitability in a digital
environment that fosters free consumption of their
products. We have proposed a model to explain how
consumers purchasing music in a PWYW scheme can
be persuaded to pay amounts significantly different
from $0. Using theories of neutralization and

persuasive computing design principles, the proposed
model suggests that persuasive techniques framed
around messages that counter the rationalizations
individuals use to consume music for free can
encourage them to change their behavior and pay for
online music. The study aims to test this model through
an online survey-based lab experiment.
However, although experiments offer a high
degree of control, we recognize in advance the threat to
internal validity that can arise from halo effects
between asking participants to state a reference price
and then asking them to purchase a song. That is,
participants’ willingness to pay may be confounded by
the experimental manipulation. To address this
problem, the study proposes to use a matched pair of
songs in order to match reference price stated for one
song to the price paid for the counterpart song. Yet, the
selection and matching of songs warrants additional
caution.
The results expected from the study will have
some important implications for management of digital
music production and distribution and research on
pricing models for digital goods. For managers of
digital music, recent progress in digital music
distribution through legal retailers such as iTunes and
streaming services such as Spotify have not
discouraged music piracy through illegal peer-to-peer
(P2P) file-sharing networks, cyberlockers and
aggregators, unlicensed streaming and stream ripping
services. Lost revenues from piracy continue to dwarf
realized revenues from digital music sales, and the
quest for more effective pricing schemes that can
convert more pirates to pay for music is still necessary.
The current study can potentially make a contribution
in this area. If persuasive techniques can mitigate the
risks involved in PWYW pricing schemes, music
providers will have an additional pricing strategy for
targeting a segment of the pirates who rely on
neutralization techniques to justify their behavior. For
research, results from the proposed study can
contribute an understanding of persuasive techniques
as a more effective mechanism for eliciting pro-social
behaviors to study and manipulate their impact on
consumer behavior in online digital goods and services
marketed through social influence. In this regard, our
study potentially contributes to growing calls by
information systems scholars (e.g. [6]; [67]) to
consider the role of social factors in the digital business
strategies of content providers.
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No Persuasion (Control)
No message

No message

No message

No message

Neutralization Techniques to be countered
Denial of responsibility :
(when individuals claim they cannot afford to
pay for music or note the widespread
availability of unauthorized music online or
the ambiguity of laws regulating
downloading);

Denial of injury/Denial of victim :
(when individuals feel that the recording
industry reaps a sizable profit and has enough
capital not to suffer lost revenue from free
downloads);

Condemnation of condemners :
(when individuals fault the music industry for
‘‘overcharging’’ the consumer through
monopolistic practices);

Appeal to Higher Loyalties:
(when individuals contend that obtaining the
unauthorized music fulfills a greater cause or
purpose, such as meeting the needs of
significant others or a work or school
obligation)

PERSUASIVE TECHNIQUES

Table 1. FACTORIAL DESIGN

The artist deserve some payment for this song even
if you are getting it for a family member, a friend or
to complete a project for school or work.

Despite holding copyrights, music providers do not
enjoy a monopoly over the distribution of their
music. Free downloads force them to appeal to
consumers by charging drastically less for their
songs.

There is no good cause or greater purpose which
can justify downloading or using this song
without paying for it.

Not paying for music may be illegal. Contrary to
popular beliefs, only a few percentage of artists
make enough money from concerts and live
performances. Entities involved in free
downloads have been prosecuted in the past.

Source: [66]

Not paying for this song may contribute to hurt
the artist and the music industry. Free music
downloads results in up to $12.5 billion of
economic losses every year, 71,060 U.S. jobs
lost, a loss of $2.7 billion in workers' earnings,
and a loss of $422 million in tax revenues, $291
million in personal income tax and $131 million
in lost corporate income and production taxes.

Not paying for this song may deprive the music
label of critical revenue, force it to lay off
employees, drop artists from its roster, and sign
fewer bands. Free downloading is ultimately
responsible for bad news for both the music
provider and music fans.

While you may have no problem with downloading
one song for free, imagine the cumulative impact of
millions of fans who also download this song
without any compensation for the music provider –
thinking that some other fans will pay for the song.

Paying for this song does not only help the
recording artist, it helps other music studio
employee working behind the scenes to bring music
to your ears, e.g. songwriters, audio engineers,
computer technicians, talent scouts and marketing
specialists, etc.

High Persuasion Condition
Reference Price: Previous buyers paid a
minimum of $5 to download this song

Moderate Persuasion Condition
Reference Price: Similar songs costs $1 per
download on iTunes / Spotify

LEVELS OF PERSUATION (With Sample Persuasive Messages)

